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CONTRACTS
Compliance With Statute-Effect on Enforceability of
Contract. The question often arises as to the validity of a con-
tract when one of contracting parties has failed to comply with
the statutory requirements making it unlawful to conduct certain
business activities in this State without having first obtained a
license.
This question was considered in three cases in the past year.
On the basis of well settled doctrines, the Supreme Court of
Appeals found little trouble in disposing of these problems.
In Lasting Products Co. v. Genovese,1 plaintiff, a Maryland
Corporation, had not complied with the requirements of the Vir-
ginia Paint Law2 which requires persons selling or transporting
paint for sale in Virginia to register annually with the Commis-
sioner of Agriculture and to label their products in a specified
manner, violation being a misdemeanor. In an attempt to recover
the balance due on the purchase price of paint sold and delivered
in Virginia, plaintiff brought the action on the contract of sale.
The Court sustained defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's evi-
dence on the grounds of non-compliance with the registration re-
quirement and entered a judgment on a verdict returned by the
jury in obedience to the court's ruling; on appeal, affirmed.
The general rule is that a contract made in violation of a
statute enacted to protect the public against fraud, imposition, or
to safeguard the public health or morals, is illegal and unenforce-
able by the guilty party.3 This rule is well settled in Virginia on
the theory that the aid of the Court will not be extended to those
parties whose transactions are tainted with illegality. Public
policy demands full recognition of the laws of the State.
1 197 Va. 1, 87 S.E.2d 811 (1955).
2 Va. Code (1950), §§59-61.1 to 59-61.12.
8 Cohen v. Mayflower Corp., 196 Va. 1153, 86 S.E.2d 860 (1955); Rohanna
v. Vozzana, 196 Va. 549, 84 S.E.2d 446 (1954); Surf Realty Corp. v.
Standling, 195 Va. 431, 78 S.E.2d 901 -(1953); Bowmen Electric Co., Inc.
v. Foley, 194 Va. 92, 72 S.E.2d 388 (1952); Colbert v. Ashland Con-
struction Co., Inc., 176 Va. 500, 11 S.E.2d 612 (1940); Massie and Miller
v. Dudley, 173 Va. 42, 3 S.E.2d 176 (1939).
In Clark v. Moore,4 plaintiff, a civil engineer, failed to comply
with Section 54-27 of the Code of Virginia (1950)5 which made
it mandatory that he obtain a license before he could lawfully
perform engineering services.
After quickly disposing of the plaintiffs contention that the
type of work performed was not engineering services, the Su-
preme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment for defendant on
essentially the same principles as were stated in the Genovese
case suPra.
The statute in question was found to be a police regulation
and not a revenue measure and had as its object the protection of
the public.
The above two cases deny recovery to the guilty party under
a contract otherwise valid but unenforceable due to non-compli-
ance with the statutory regulations. In contrast to this situation
a unique question has been raised with respect to allowing the
guilty party to use this omission, i.e., his failure to comply with
statutory requirements, as a defense when the innocent party at-
tempts to enforce his rights under the contract.
In Cohen v. Mayflower Corporation, this very question arose.
Plaintiff had contracted with defendant to have its buildings
waterproofed and upon completion of the job paid defendant the
amount due under the contract. After notifying defendant of
the continued leakage of the buildings and after unsuccessful at-
tempts to remedy the defects the plaintiff engaged another con-
tractor to do the job. The suit, in the instant case, was brought
to recover damages for failure to perform the contract success-
fully.
Defendant in his answer alleged that as a result of his failure
4 196 Va. 878, 86 S.E.2d 37 (1955).
6 Va. Code (1950) Sec. 54-27, "In order to safeguard life, health and prop-
erty, any person practicing or offering to practice as ... a professional
engee... shall hereafter be required to submit reasonably evidence
to the Board ... and to be certified as herein provided. It shall be un-
lawful for any person to practice . . . the profession of engineering
... unless such person has been duly registered . .." Sec. 54-17(2),
definitions, "Professional engineer shall be deemed to cover a civil
engineer, mechanical engineer .. ." etc.
6196 V 1153, 86 S.E.2d 860 (1955).
to obtain a license under Title 54 of the Code,1 the contract was
void and therefore unenforceable.
This specific situation had not been previously before the
Court, but on the basis of sound reasoning, the Court held that
plaintiff, as an innocent party to the contract, was not in pari
delicto with the defendant, the unlicensed contractor, but was
rather among the class of persons designed to be protected by
the statute.8
Some jurisdictions have disposed of this question on the
principle that the unlicensed party is estopped to assert as a de-,
fense his failure to comply with the provisions of the statute.'
If otherwise, the very purpose of the statute would be defeated.10
This result is consistent with the prevailing view in other juris-
dictions.
Offer and Acceptance. There must be an offer and an ac-
ceptance in order to consummate a contract. This fundamental
rule in contracts was again expressed in Nolan Bros. v. Century
Sprinkler Corp." A contractor's letter, replying to Sprinkler
Corporation's quotation of price for installing a sprinkler system
was not such acceptance of the Corporation's offer to install for a
stated price, in accordance with terms and conditions of the
original offer, as to ripen into contract. The "acceptance" of the
offer varied from its terms and in effect constituted a counter-
offer wanting acceptance.
The offeree, Nolan, had made two qualifications in his letter
of acceptance to Century in that it stipulated that Nolan would
draw up the contract between the parties and also a work schedule
was to be made a part of such contract. These terms were listed
in the standard form used by all sprinkler companies nationally
and were included in the offeror's letter.
A party to whom the offer is made must either accept it
wholly or reject it wholly. A proposition to accept on terms
varying from those offered is a rejection of the offer, and a sub-
7 Va. Code (1950), S$54-113-145.
8 Restatement, Contracts $90, at 1116 (1932).
9Ferguson v. Sutphen, 8 Il. 547; Romano v. Brown, 125 N.J.L. 293, 15
A.2d 818, 820.
10 6 Corbin, Contracts, p. 1070; 5 Williston, Contracts, p. 4568.
11220 F.2d 726 (1955).
stitution in its place of a counter proposition.12 It puts an end to
the negotiation so far as the original offer is concerned.
A plain enforceable proposal followed by a plain uncondi-
tional acceptance, neither narrower nor broader than that pro-
posal, generally constitutes a contract. The offeror has a right
to prescribe in his offer any condition as to time, place, quantity,
mode of acceptance or other matters which it may please him to
insert in and make a part thereof, and the acceptance to conclude
the agreement must in every respect meet and correspond with
the offer.
Ambiguity of Contract-Parol Evidence. Often the con-
tract will contain obvious inconsistencies, conflicts, and ambigui-
ties in the provisions and hence will require that extrinsic evidence
be received in explanation.
In Boling v. Hawthorne Coal Co., '1 what appeared to be a
lease between the parties was found by the court to be actually
a contract of conditional sale. The court permitted the intro-
duction of extrinsic evidence to clarify the ambiguous and con-
flicting terms of the contract and arrived at its conclusion based
on the well settled proposition that a contract may be interpreted
in the light of surrounding facts and circumstances in order to de-
termine the real meaning and intention of the parties and not for
the purpose of varying the plain terms of the instrument.14
The real purpose and intention of the parties thereby are
brought to the forefront as the courts attempt to place them-
selves in the same situation as the parties at the time the contract
was executed. 15 Such ambiguities must be latent in the contract
and the evidence must not add words to the instrument, substitute
others, or contradict or vary the terms of the instrument.'
12Hoge and Bro. v. Prince William Co-op Ex., 141 Va. 676, 126 S.E. 687
(1925); Bloomberry-Michael Furn. Co. v. Cappes. Bros. 141 Va. 18, 126
S.E. 59 (1925); Crews v. Sullivan, 133 Va. 478, 113 S.E. 865 (1922);
Richeson Hardwood Lbr. Co. v. Hughes, 140 Va. 249, 12 SE. 283,
(1924).
18 197 Va. 554, 90 S.E.2d 159 (1955).
14Ford v. Street, 129 Va. 437, 106 S.E. 379, (1921); Virginia Ry. Co. v.
Avis, 124 Va. 711, 98 SE. 638, (1919); Jones v. Gammon, 140 Va. 704,
125 S.E. 681, (1924).
16 Matthews v. LaPrade, 130 Va. 408, 107 SE. 795 (1921); 7 M.J. E.idence,
$148.
16 Shockey v. Wescott, 189 Va. 381, 53 S.E.2d 17 (1949).
Specific Performance. Where the remedy at law is inade-
quate and the nature of the contract is such that ,specific per-
formance of it will not involve great practical diflic lties, equity
will grant specific performance of the contract.
In Thompson v. Commonwealth,17 the court granted specific
performance of a contract the subject matter of which was found
to be unique.18 The defendant Thompson was employed by the
Commonwealth to install and improve vote recording systems of
his invention in the Capitol. The defendant was under a contract
which required the delivery of certain spare parts for the ma-
chines installed in the Capitol, The Commonwealth was granted
specific performance of the .contract since it involved personal
property not readily available on the open market for which
defendants were the only experienced manufacturers.
It was conceded that these parts were not readily available
on the open market but that a first class machine shop could
build the necessary parts.
The doctrine is well settled that a court of equity will not, in
general, decree specific performance of contracts relating to
chattels, yet it will do so where the remedy at law is inadequate
to meet all the requirements of a given case, and to do complete
justice between the parties. 19
Where there is a special need on the part of the plaintiff and
at least a temporary monopoly on the part of the defendant the
court is less technical in the application of specific performance
of a contract relating to chattels.20 The only doubtful point
raised was whether or not there was an adequate remedy at law
in that an experienced machine shop could do the necessary work
called for. Specific performance was granted however because
of the burden and risk that would be imposed upon the Com-
monwealth.
17 197 Va. 208, 89 S.E.2d 64, (1955).
18 The subject matter in the Thompson case was not readily purchasable in
the market and the word unique in this respect meant the difficulty of
obtaining the parts called for in the contract from one other than the
defendant.
19 Stuart v. Permis, 91 Va. 688, 22 S.E. 509 (1895).
20 17 M.J. Contract, §63, p. 97; 5 Williston, Contracts, rev. ed. §1419, pp.
3954, 3955.
Considering the difficulty involved in searching for a first
class machine shop which could manufacture these parts, the
court rightly placed this burden on the defendant who had con-
tracted to do the job.
Oral Promise to Devise-Statute of Frauds. An oral con-
tract made with a party involving a promise to devise realty is
unenforceable because in violation of the Statute of Frauds.
The effect of the Statutes of Frauds was felt in Cocbrane
v. Rise,21 where the plaintiff agreed to perform services in return
for an oral promise to devise a share of realty to him upon the
death of the promisor. The promise was never fulfilled by the
promisor and the promisee sued for specific performance.
Precluded by the Statute of Frauds from recovery, the court
turned to the theory of implied contract, as it normally does in
this type of case, granting the plaintiff recovery for the reason-
able value of services performed.
The Statute of Frauds makes contracts unenforceable but
not void. Recovery is nevertheless allowed on the theory that
where an agreement is not illegal but merely unenforceable and
one of the parties refuses to perform his promise after the per-
formance or part performance by the other, the law will per-
ceive an implied promise to pay a reasonable compensation for
the benefits received. 22
Recognizing clearly the application of the Statute of Frauds,
the cases are many which will imply a contract to pay a reason-
able amount for services rendered by a party who has faithfully
performed unaware of the intricacies of the law. The courts of
equity will not allow the Statute of Frauds to be used as an in-
strument of fraud.28
A distinction is noted, however, where the services are per-
formed by a member of a family. In such a case a rebuttable pre-
sumption arises that such services are gratuitous.2
4
21 197 Va. 483, 90 SE.2d 178 (1955).
22 Richs v. Sumler, 179 Va. 571, 19 SZE.2d 889 (1942).
2 Canmon v. Canmon, 158 Va. 12, 163 S.E. 405 (1932); Simpson v. Scott,
189 Va. 392, 52 S.E.2d 21 (1949).
2 4 Stoneburner v. Motley, 95 Va. 784, 30 S.E. 364 (1898); Jackson v. Jack-
son, 96 Va. 165, 31 S.E. 78 (1898).
All due respect to the Statute of Frauds and strict compliance
with its terms is necessary to prevent fabricated agreements,
fraud, or unfounded claims, yet the courts will not deny a re-
covery where an innocent party has acted in reliance upon an
oral promise.
Contracts-Venue of Action for Breach. A cause of ac-
tion for breach of contract may be brought in the jurisdiction
where the contract is made or in that in which a breach occurs.
Negotiations which are merely preliminary to a contract, wher-
ever made, are not to be considered binding on the parties.m 25
However, if the only function that remains is to reduce the oral
terms to a formal writing, then the place where the oral terms
were agreed upon is a proper venue for any subsequent suit that
may arise.
In Coal Corp. v. Railroad Company,2e the court considered
the proper venue to be where the breach of the contract occurred.
Under a contract for the shipment of coal, the terms expressly
stated that the coal was to be shipped "F.O.B. mine" which was
located in Wise County. The uncontradicted evidence showed
that defendant breached the contract' in Wise County in that it
refused to accept shipments of coal which were tendered to it at
the mine. The obligation to deliver property under a contract
implies the correlative obligation to receive, and therefore the
refusal to receive is a breach of the contract. 7 The effect of a
breach of contract is generally to render the party guilty of such
breach liable to the injured party for the resulting loss or injury.
A breach of contract has been defined as, "a failure without legal
excuse to perform any promise which forms the whole or part
of a contract." 28
Where the parties had agreed to ship the coal "F.O.B. mine"
and a refusal to accept such shipments as were ready occurred,
the court properly held the cause of action to have arisen in Wise
County where the mine was located.29
25 Bousian v. Fuller, 96 Va. 45, 30 S. 457 (1898); Adams v. Hazen, 123 Va.
304,96 S.E. 741 (1918).
26 196 Va. 686, 85 S.E.2d 228 (1955).
27 Ragland v. Butler, 18 Gratt (59 Va.) 346 (1868).
28 17 C.JS, Contracts 1457 (1939).
29 For the proper venue and service statutes see S 8-39, 8-47, 8-59, Va. Code
(1950).
Assignment-Defenses Good Against Assignor Good
Against Assignee. The extent of a contractor's liability to his
subcontractor for the payment of labors and materialmen was
discussed in National Bank and Trust Co. v. Castle. Defendant
Castle, as general contractor with the City of Charlottesville for
the construction of a school building, subcontracted to Albemarle
Plumbing Co. the installation of plumbing and heating equipment.
Under the terms of his contract with the City and of his perform-
ance bond, Castle was required to pay for all labor and materials,
and Albemarle was by the terms of his contract similarly bound
to Castle.
To secure plaintiff Bank for sums advanced to meet its ex-
penses on the job, Albemarle assigned to the Bank all sums due
and to become due under the contract. Notice of the assignment
was given Castle on June 4, 1951. Prior and subsequent to this
time, Castle had been notified of claims by materialmen against
Albemarle which exceeded in value the amount ultimately paid
Castle by the City for the work subcontracted to Albemarle.
The principal question involved was the rights of the as-
signee, the Bank, to the accounts receivable made by Albemarle as
against the contractor, Castle. The Bank contended that its as-
signor, Albemarle, having performed all of the work required
under its contract was entitled to be paid the full amount agreed
upon. Castle, the defendant, argued that the assignment to the
Bank covered only such sum as would become due Albemarle
under its contract with Castle; that nothing ever became due to
Albemarle because its failure to pay its subcontractors resulted in
placing the obligation to pay them upon Castle; that, therefore,
Castle never became liable to Albemarle, and consequently there
is nothing on which the assignment can operate.
The court held that the Bank as assignee stood in the shoes
of its assignor and any defense good against the assignor would
be equally as effective against the assignee.81
The nonpayment of materialmen by the subcontractor was
a defense available to the contractor at all times before and after
the assignment. If the assignor never had any enforceable rights
8o 196 Va. 686, 85 S.E.2d 228 (1955).
81 Norton v. Rose, 2 Wash. (2 Va.) 233 (1796); Feazle v. Dillard, 5 Leigh
(32 Va.) 31 (1834); Etheridge v. Parker, 76 Va. 247 (1882).
against the contractor, the assignee stood in no better position
and hence acquired no right against the contractor.82
Conclusions: In 1956 little controversy has arisen in the
field of contracts; of the nine cases surveyed only one presented
an original problem (the Cohen case, supra), and this was dis-
posed of unanimously by the Court. The remaining eight were
decided on well-established principles of contract. There were
no dissenting opinions voiced in any of the nine cases studied.
Joseph M. Maurizi
82 Selden v. Williams, 108 Va. 542, 62 SE. 380 (1908); Finney v. Bennett, 27
Gratt. (68 Va.) 365 (1876).
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